What effect did the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have on U.S. policy to the Caribbean?

The terrorist attacks of 2001 produced several marked changes in the overall foreign policy of the world’s superpower. United States reduced its definition of national security to focus primarily on combating terrorism, the evaluation of most other political priorities in terms of its contribution to the perception that the primary objective. The United States has also shown a new willingness to take the lead in world affairs, which sometimes leads to a unilateralism that annoys other nations. The implementation of these policies worldwide in subregions relatively divorced from major terrorist incidents such as the Caribbean can be inflexible and severe.

As a matter of fact, the impact of 9/11 in the Caribbean has been varied in many ways. Indeed, a multi-faceted event that impacts crucial in a process complex social, economic and political has become deeply woven into the score of nations around the Caribbean basin. The attacks of 9/11 has reshaped U.S. policy to the region in a number of areas, from trade restrictions on migration, travel, tourism, financial aid, military aid, drug interdiction and foreign policy in terms of intervention in the areas of volatility.

While the focus of this paper is on the effects of 9/11 in the formulation of U.S. policy to the Caribbean and the resulting consequences, we must take a look at reshaping U.S. policy worldwide, namely:

or terrorism has replaced communism as against the whole purpose of the 21st century justification for the provision of U.S. military aid, arms and training to foreign militaries;

U.S. or security assistance is on the rise since 9/11, which flows to a widening group of states, and

restrictions or multiple keys on arms sales and military aid have resigned or sacked to make way for the new terrorism assistance.

Some experts in international relations have predicted that this new change in the foreign policy of the United States has led to the emergence of key issues, including:

Other geo-strategic or policy that have faced harsh criticism in the pre-09.11 – such as counterinsurgency aid or protecting U.S. access sources of oil are being approved on behalf of the fight against terrorism;

or terrorism is succeeding against all other foreign policy concerns, opening the way for new relationships with repressive regimes, and

or U.S. aid, arms and training related to the fight against terrorism can destabilize tense regions.

In light of the convergence of U.S. foreign policy during the years of the Monroe doctrine to the Truman, the onset of the Cold War, U.S. and the Third World, the rearmament of Reagan and the fall of communism, a review of the last change in the Caribbean states are required to establish a framework by which these small satellite countries must now engage in the world superpower that is set.

On trade, the Caribbean has suffered at the hands of the stalled negotiations on the Free Trade Area of ​​the Americas. Originally slated to achieve significant progress in 2005 and implementation by 2008, the FTAA has been an important forum through which Caribbean States could have had access to hemispheric markets. Since 9/11, and given the dispute between Brazil and the United States by subsidies in agriculture, among other issues, we have witnessed a proliferation of trade negotiations with the United States to participate more often in regional debates and bilateral rather than at the multinational level [FTAA].

The Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Caribbean and the then Secretary of State of the United States, Colin Powell, held on February 7, 2002 in Nassau, Bahamas, the Foreign Ministers of the Caribbean Community [ CARICOM] and the Dominican Republic, trade and investment put firmly at the top of the agenda. He reminded the United States of the great advantage which has been enjoying its balance of trade with the Caribbean since the establishment of the Basin Initiative Caribbean in 1983. The events of 9/11 and its devastating effects on the economy of the Caribbean have also found their place on the agenda. . The impact on Caribbean tourism and travel industry and the diversion of scarce resources from development priorities to the new security requirements of concern.

The United States, in accordance with Article IX: 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization on February 24, 2005 requested an extension of the current exemption from the provisions of the Act, the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery of 1983 and the amendments included in the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1990 expansion. This expansion is valid until September 30, 2008. This was standard procedure and reflects to some extent the U.S. ambivalence toward creating a more vigorous policy for the Caribbean since 9.11. This observation is particularly prudent given the expectations of a more dynamic relationship between the two areas after the Summit of the Caribbean / USA – “Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean” on May 10, 1997 in Bridgetown, Barbados .

As a matter of fact, the United States began to put more emphasis in terms of trade negotiations with Central American nations, as indicated by the signature of the Central American Free Trade Agreement on May 28, 2004. Although U.S. exports to the Caribbean increased from $ 338.12 million in 2001 to $ 409.35 million in 2002, a 21.07% move upward, not due to a change in U.S. policy to the Caribbean, but with the benefits to the U.S. unavoidable due to the imposition of structural adjustment policies and trade liberalization by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Despite the attention of the current U.S. administration elsewhere, they have managed to maintain a good level contribution of development aid to the region. In FY 2005, development assistance in the Caribbean of the United States was U.S. $ 370 million.

With regard to travel and tourism in the Caribbean, the events of 9/11 had a devastating effect on the industry around. While the stakeholders, including airlines and hotels have shown a reluctance to respond to the consequences of these attacks, the new travel restrictions on U.S. citizens threaten to temper this expected growth, a very capricious industry. The U.S. Government made mandatory January 8, 2007 for all U.S. citizens traveling to the Caribbean to do with the use of a passport. Many analysts, given the fact that only a quarter of Americans have a passport, predict that this will have an adverse effect on travel to the region. Introduction Bush administration Initiative Western Hemisphere Travel, fully implement the June 1, 2009, will have a profound effect on how travel is done by the Americans in the Caribbean because many of them were used to traveling with a birth certificate or driver’s license.

The government argues that adjustments will be minimal and that the transition will be smoother than expected. We must realize that tourism plays a vital role in the economy of the Caribbean. The World Travel and Tourism estimates that tourism in 2005 accounted for 4.5% or U.S. $ 8.7 billion regional GDP and this figure is estimated to grow to about 5.2% or U.S. $ 18.4 billion in 2014. It is evident that a change in U.S. policy and should have a profound impact on the basis of the considerable amount of visitors to the region by the Americans. Note that since 9/11, although tourism in the Caribbean has been growing, the growth rate has been decreasing, ie, 7.1% in 2003, 6.9% in 2004 and 3.5 % in 2005.

In terms of regional security, some experts have accused the United States to turn away in the Caribbean since 9/11. In 2003, most Caribbean countries do not support the Bush administration’s call for war with Iraq. This, together with the concentration of Washington in the war against terrorism has left the region without the full support of the various agencies of the U.S. government. His focus has shifted primarily to national security and the war on terror. This lack of attention in the Caribbean has left many heads of government uncomfortable, especially with his own battle against crime, ie drug trafficking.

U.S. support to the war on drugs in the region has stagnated since 9/11. More emphasis is now on security in ports of call, especially those close to the continental U.S. as the Bahamas. As a matter of fact, the United States has ordered the Government of the Bahamas to install the latest equipment at the port of Freeport, as an additional security measure to check the load before entering Miami in particular. The focus has shifted to the transportation of energetic material based on the United States as fears in intelligence circles that a future attack on the U.S. could get through this method.

For the years 2001 to 2003, U.S. military aid and economic assistance to the Bahamas, Belize, the Eastern Caribbean, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago was estimated at U.S. $ 41.56 million. The allocation to these countries for the period 2004-2006 is estimated at $ 36.59 million, a decrease of approximately U.S. $ 4.7 million. Add to this the fact that military aid temporarily retired from the United States to Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago, as these countries did not agree to protect U.S. troops of prosecution under the International Criminal Court and one would be easy to pontificate a little less enthusiastic approach by the U.S. government to address the security issues in the region. As a footnote, it should be noted that the vast majority of military aid to Latin America and the Caribbean the post 9/11 went to Colombia’s anti-kidnapping program.

Although the United States was the leading power in the restoration of President Jean Bertrand Aristide [Haiti] in 1994 and 2001, and the fact that some experts say you had a hand in his retirement in 2004, the United States since 9 / 11 has adopted a somewhat smaller role for itself in Haiti, with the Canadians and the French taking the lead in the establishment of a Stabilization Mission in Haiti United Nations [MINUSTAH] in June 2004. The U.S. has carried out a policy of withdrawal from Haiti, that is, because the state does not have any terrorist threat to the United States and the fact that no energy sources, oil and natural gas. This is far from the U.S. policy before 9/11 especially when you consider the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and the Bay of Pigs [Cuba] in 1961.

The aftermath of 9/11 has added some new tensions in U.S. relations with the leading politicians of the Caribbean states, while just exacerbate existing tensions. The longstanding pattern of overall U.S. influence in the region predominant policy [with the exception of Cuba] has not been altered. Instead, limited frictions that are part of this asymmetry in power have increased somewhat. Perhaps paradoxically, although Cuba is the adversary of the United States most important, Havana has developed in the region more institutionalized migration relations with Washington. A series of formal agreements initiated in 1984 and last amended in 1995, have committed the U.S. to emit at least 20,000 immigrant visas per year to citizens of Cuba and the return of unauthorized migrants to Cuba that have been intercepted at sea.

Since 9/11, immigration relations between Jamaica and the U.S. been put under pressure by reducing visa issuance and Jamaica concerns that the decision of his country in other areas of foreign policy may have proved costly in the field of migration. Despite claims of U.S. Ambassador in Jamaica, shortly after 9/11 that “we expect nothing less of visas offered during the next twelve months, visas 37% less visitors were distributed, although processing of immigrant visas increased slightly.

The issue of deportation of Caribbean countries the United States has gained strength since 9/11. That has had a negative impact on recipient countries, as has been directly correlated with an increase in crime across the region.

A migration tendency of multilateral negotiations in the Caribbean also has slowed, largely due to the coldness of U.S. toward him. From late 1990, when Caribbean States tried to counter or reverse U.S. restrictive measures approved in 1996, the States of the region sometimes acted together to pressure the United States more often than in previous years. The ability to participate in the initiative of Mexico [2001] could have driven this trend. What seems clear is that the U.S. now has little enthusiasm for multilateral diplomacy with the Caribbean.

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